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KASTEN v. SAINT-GOBAIN PERFORMANCE PLASTICS
CORP.
53 U.S. ___ (2011)
Petitioner Kasten brought an antiretaliation
suit
against his former employer, respondent (Saint-
Gobain), under the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938
(Act), which provides minimum wage, maximum
hour,
and overtime pay rules; and which forbids
employers
“to discharge . . . any employee because such
employee
[continued]
has filed any complaint” alleging a violation of
the
Act, 29 U. S. C. §215(a)(3). In a related suit,
the District
Court found that Saint-Gobain violated the Act
by placing timeclocks in a location that
prevented
workers from receiving credit for the time they
spent
donning and doffing work related protective
gear.
In this suit Kasten claims that he was
discharged
because he orally complained to company
officials
about the timeclocks. The District Court granted
Saint-Gobain summary judgment, concluding that
the
Act’s antiretaliation provision did not cover
oral complaints.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Justice Breyer
delivered the opinion of the Court in which
Chief Justice
Roberts, and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Alito
and Sotomayor joined. Justice Scalia filed a
dissenting
opinion in which Justice Thomas joined in part.
Justice
Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision
of
the case.
BREYER, J.: The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
(Act) sets forth employment rules concerning
minimum
wages, maximum hours, and overtime pay. 52
Stat. 1060, 29 U. S. C. §201 et seq. The Act
contains an
antiretaliation provision that forbids employers
“to discharge or in any other manner
discriminate
against any employee because such employee has
filed any complaint or instituted or caused to
be
instituted any proceeding under or related to
[the
Act], or has testified or is about to testify in
such
proceeding, or has served or is about to serve
on an
industry committee.” §215(a)(3) (emphasis
added).
We must decide whether the statutory term “filed
any
complaint” includes oral as well as written
complaints
within its scope. We conclude that it does.
I The petitioner, Kevin Kasten, brought this
antiretaliation
lawsuit against his former employer, Saint-
Gobain Performance Plastics Corporation. Kasten
says that where Kasten and other workers put on
(and
take off) their work-related protective gear and
the
area where they carry out their assigned tasks.
That
location prevented workers from receiving credit
for
the time they spent putting on and taking off
their
work clothes—contrary to the Act’s requirements.
In
a related suit the District Court agreed with
Kasten,
finding that Saint-Gobain’s “practice of not
compensating
. . . for time spent donning and doffing certain
required protective gear and walking to work
areas”
violated the Act. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain
Performance
Plastics Corp., 556 F. Supp. 2d 941, 954 (WD
Wis.
2008). In this suit Kasten claims unlawful
retaliation.
He says that Saint-Gobain discharged him because
he
orally complained to Saint-Gobain officials
about the
timeclocks.
In particular, Kasten says that he repeatedly
called
the unlawful timeclock location to
Saint-Gobain’s
attention— in accordance with Saint-Gobain’s
internal
grievance resolution procedure. See Brief for
Petitioner
4 (quoting Saint-Gobain’s Code of Ethics and
Business
Conduct as imposing upon every employee “the
responsibility
to report . . . suspected violations of . . .
any
applicable law of which he or she becomes
aware”); id.,
at 4–5 (quoting Saint-Gobain’s Employee Policy
Handbook
as instructing employees with “questions,
complaints,
and problems” to“[c]ontact” their “supervisor[s]
immediately” and if necessary “take the issue to
the
next level of management,” then to the “local
Human
Resources Manager,” then to “Human Resources”
personnel
at the “Regional” or “Headquarters” level).
Kasten adds that he “raised a concern” with his
shift supervisor that “it was illegal for the
time clocks
to be where they were” because of Saint-Gobain’s
exclusion of “the time you come in and start
doing
stuff”; he told a human resources employee that
“if
they were to get challenged on” the location in
court,
“they would lose”; he told his lead operator
that the
location was illegal and that he “was thinking
about
starting a lawsuit about the placement of the
time
clocks”; and he told the human resources manager
and the operations manager that he thought the
location
was illegal and that the company would “lose” in
court. Record in No. 3:07–cv–00686–bbc (WD
Wis.),
Doc.87–3, pp. 31–34 (deposition of Kevin
Kasten).
This activity, Kasten concludes, led the company
to
discipline him and, in December 2006, to dismiss
him.
Saint-Gobain presents a different version of
events.
It denies that Kasten made any significant
complaint
about the timeclock location. And it says that
it dismissed
Kasten simply because Kasten, after being
repeatedly warned, failed to record his comings
and
goings on the timeclock.
For present purposes we accept Kasten’s version
of these contested events as valid. See Scott v.
Harris,
550 U. S. 372, 380 (2007). That is because the
District
Court entered summary judgment in Saint-Gobain’s
favor. . . . Kasten sought certiorari. And in
light of
conflict among the Circuits as to whether an
oral complaint
is protected, we granted Kasten’s petition. . .
.
The sole question presented is whether “an oral
complaint
of a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act”
is “protected conduct under the [Act’s] anti-retaliation
provision.” Pet. for Cert. i. The Act protects
employees
who have “filed any complaint,” 29 U. S. C.
§215(a)(3),
and interpretation of this phrase “depends upon
reading
the whole statutory text, considering the
purpose
and context of the statute, and consulting any
precedents or authorities that inform the
analysis,”
[continued]
693
[continued]
Dolan v. Postal Service, 546 U. S. 481, 486
(2006).
This analysis leads us to conclude that the
language of
the provision, considered in isolation, may be
open to
competing interpretations. But considering the
provision
in conjunction with the purpose and context
leads
us to conclude that only one interpretation is
permissible.
We begin with the text of the statute. The word
“filed” has different relevant meanings in
different contexts.
. . .The bottom line is that the text, taken
alone,
cannot provide a conclusive answer to our
interpretive
question. The phrase “filed any complaint”
might, or
might not, encompass oral complaints. We must
look
further. . . .
Why would Congress want to limit the enforcement
scheme’s effectiveness by inhibiting use of the
Act’s
complaint procedure by those who would find it
difficult
to reduce their complaints to writing,
particularly
illiterate, less educated, or overworked
workers? . . .
In the years prior to the passage of the Act,
illiteracy
rates were particularly high among the poor. . .
.
To limit the scope of the antiretaliation
provision to
the filing of written complaints would also take
needed
flexibility from those charged with the Act’s
enforcement.
It could prevent Government agencies from
using hotlines, interviews, and other oral
methods of
receiving complaints. . . . To fall within the
scope of
the antiretaliation provision, a complaint must
be sufficiently
clear and detailed for a reasonable employer
to understand it, in light of both content and
context,
as an assertion of rights protected by the
statute and
a call for their protection. This standard can
be met,
however, by oral complaints, as well as by
written
ones. . . .
Second, given Congress’ delegation of
enforcement
powers to federal administrative agencies, we
also give a degree of weight to their views
about the
meaning of this enforcement language. . . . The
Secretary
of Labor has consistently held the view that
the words “filed any complaint” cover oral, as
well
as written, complaints. . . . The EEOC has set
forth
a similar view in its Compliance Manual . . .
These
agency views are reasonable. They are consistent
with
the Act. . . . We conclude that the Seventh
Circuit erred
in determining that oral complaints cannot fall
within
the scope of the phrase “filed any complaint” in
the
Act’s antiretaliation provision. We leave it to
the lower
courts to decide whether Kasten will be able to
satisfy
the Act’s notice requirement. We vacate the
Circuit’s
judgment and remand the case for further
proceedings
